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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN YOUNG and 
STELLA YOUNG, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
1 GEORGE BRIDWELL, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 
10774 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellants brought an action against the 
respondent for breach of contract and negligence in 
the handling of a case for the appellants, and now 
appeal from a judgment dismissing their complaint 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court for Salt Lake County heard 
argument of counsel for both the appellants and re-
~1mnden t and then ruled as a matter of law that 
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plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed, no cause 
of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek reversal of the District 
Court judgment as it relates to matters of law and 
for remand of the case for trial by a jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Originally, the respondent in this matter was 
retained by the appellants for the purpose of pur-
suing an action in the District Court of Salt LakP 
County, upon the Complaint which is marked "Ex-
hibit B", attached to Plaintiffs' -Appellants' Com-
plaint which is a part of the record on file in this 
action. It is basically because of Respondent's breach 
of his fiduciary contractual duty to the appellants 
and his negligence in the handling of the case above i 
mentioned that gave rise to the present controversy. 
Respondents' wrongful conduct of which Appel-
lants complained is specifically set out in detail in 
Plaintiffs'-Appellants' Complaint in a series of five 
( 5) alternative causes of action, and the Appellants 
rely upon the Complaint to fully set forth an accurate , 
statement of facts as it relates to this matter. 
Specifically, however, Appellants assert 
that the Respondent breached his contract and was 
negligent because of his: (1) inattention to the case 
in having Alan D. Frandsen try the case when he was 
not sufficiently acquainted with the case, and, there· 
fore, allowing the Judge to err in certain specific 
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orders, (a) the Court's pretrial order, which is at-
tached as "Exhibit A" to Plaintiffs' -Appellants' 
Complaint in holding as a matter of law that accept-
ance of payment amounted to renewal of the lease, 
and (b) entry of its findings of fact, wherein it 
stated that the Lease had been extended for a period 
of five ( 5) years, because of the acceptance of rental 
payments. ( 2) Failing to notify Plaintiffs-Appel-
lants of their Rights of Appeal and the time in 
which they could appeal. 
Because the Court decided that the results would 
not have been different on appeal in the original 
case it dismissed the present case now before the 
Court and from such decision relief is sought. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS PRE-TRIAL 
i ORDER IN ELIMINATING AS AN ISSUE; IS 
THE HIRING OF ANOTHER ATTORNEY WITH-
OUT THE CONSENT OF THE CLIENT ACTION-
ABLE AS A BREACH OF CONTRACT? 
In its pre-trial order the Court discussed wheth-
er it was an act of negligence on the part of the Re-
spondent to hire another attorney without the consent 
of the client and in so doing stated: 
"The Court finds no negligence that can be 
d " prove ... 
and further: 
" ... the conduct of the Defendant in em-
ploying Mr. Frandsen would only be material 
in that it caused another attorney to be at the 
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trial, and possibly Mr. Bridwell was not fully 
informed as to the Court's action at the Pre-
trial and the Trial, in giving the Plaintiff the 
advice that Plaintiff claims she received." 
(Page 3, Pre-trial Order.) 
In making the above order the pre-trial Court 
completely overlooked the appellants contention that 
the hiring of another attorney without their consent 
amounted to a breach of contract. 
The Court may have been correct in ruling as a 
matter of law that such conduct was not actionable 
when founded upon negligence but the Court erred 
when it eliminated this issue as it relates to breach 
of contract. 
The Appellants contend that they hired the Re-
spondent to perform certain legal services for them 
and that, without their consent, the Respondent 
hired another attorney to represent them. The Ap-
pellants further assert that they were not aware of 
this fact until the day of the trial when they were 
met by Mr. Frandsen at the Court room shortly be-
fore trial time. (Marvin C. Young Deposition, page 
15, lines 19-21.) At this time apparently even Mr. 
Frandsen was uncertain that he would be trying the 
case because he was still expecting the Respondent 
to appear at the trial. (Marvin C. Young Deposition, 
page 17, lines 20-26, and Alan D. Frandsen Deposi-
tion, page 22, lines 9-12). 
When a person is retained for the purpose of 
performing some personal service, as the respondent 
was,(Marvin C. Young Deposition, page 10, lin~s 
1-17) to hire someone else to perform the services is 
clearly a breach of contract. Meyer v. Washington 
Times Co., (1935) 64 App D. C. 218, 76 F 2d 988. 
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The Court should not have eliminated this mat-
ter at pre-trial under the single theory of negligence, 
but should have allowed as an issue for trial, the 
question of breach of contract. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
THE RESULTS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DIF-
FERENT ON APPEAL IN THE ORIGINAL CASE 
AND THEREFORE AN APPEAL WOULD HA VE 
BEEN OF NO AV AIL. 
It is the general rule of law with which the 
appellants have no argument, that to hold an attor-
ney liable for negligence in not advising a client of 
his rights of appeal, you must prove that if the appeal 
or new trial had been obtained, a judgment more 
favorable to the Plaintiff, would have resulted. There 
are numerous cases in connection with this matter, 
and they are annotated in 45 ALR 2d 55, also cited 
in 7 Am Jur. 2d, 149 Attorney section 172. There-
fore, it is the obligation of the Appellants to first 
prove that the results of the appeal would have been 
favorable to them, thus reversing the trial Court's 
decision. The Appellants will therefore address their 
remarks to the law relating to leases and lease re-
newal which was the subject of the original case and 
is the subject matter which is claimed to have been 
ruled in err upon by the trial Court in the original 
case which Respondent was hired to litigate. It is 
upon this legal concept that the Appellants claim the 
results would have been different had Respondent 
advised Appellants of their right of Appeal and had 
an appeal been taken. 
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Generally, it is held that where a Lessee, having 
a general privilege of extending the Lease, holds 
over even without any notice to the Lessor of his 
election to extend the Lease for the further term 
' his holding over constitutes an election so as to extend 
and he is entitled as against the Lessor to hold for 
a further term. This is the general rule of law as set 
forth in 64 ALR 316n., with numerous annotations 
supporting this proposition, with which general 
proposition the Appellants find no fault, however, 
as is the case with all general rules, there are numer-
ous exceptions, and it is to one of these exceptions 
that the Appellants claim a contrary rule. In the 
case of Carhart vs. White Mantel & Tile Company, 
(1909) 122 Tenn. 455, 123 S. W. 747, wherein it 
was held: 
"The mere continuance of occupancy by 
the tenant or lessee after the expiration of the 
lease period is ordinarily accepted as the exer-
cise of the option reserved in the lease to 
occupy the premises for an additional term . 
.h . .,/,6/ ·-.r:;~ ":,,-j This is the presumption that ordinarily arises 
rzcV?t , "/.-A'rc~~:~from Aygyst 10, lQ(:)g to J .. ugust 10, 1Qe7, eR 
faf ~~~{/ ( /;v not conclusive of the ~e~see's intention to accept 
J. -c;:, J ·<t .. £ .. <'.'. the lease for an add1t10nal term. If the lease, 
' . as in this case, provides for an additional term 
at an increased rental, and after the expira-
tion of the lease period the tenant holds over 
and pays the increased rental, this is affir!11a-
tive evidence on his part that he has exercised 
the option to take the lease for an additional 
term; but where, under a lease like the present, 
the tenant holds over after the expiration .of 
the original term, and does not pay the in-
creased rental as provided by the lease, bi~t 
continues to pay the original rental, which is 
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accepted by the lessor, this negatives the idea 
of the acceptance of the privilege of an addi-
tional term. Under such circumstances, the 
lessee holding over will occupy the status of a 
tenant at will." (Emphasis added.) 
It would thus appear, that the Court below in the 
original case erred in two ways, First, in holding as 
a matter of law, that the tender of rent at the same 
amount, constituted a renewal because the option 
agreement in our present lease provides: 
"The lessees shall have the option to ex-
tend said lease for an additional five ( 5) years 
from August 10, 1962 to August 10, 1967, on 
the same terms and conditions as the original 
lease, except the rental payment thereof." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Therefore, the lease in the present case, like the 
Tennessee case, provided for a new term on the same 
terms, except as to payment, and therefore, a tender 
of payment in an amount the same as due under 
the prior lease did not renew the lease for a like 
amount, but created only a tenancy at will. Second, 
the Court erred in making a finding in this matter, 
as a matter of law. As the Tennessee case also points 
out, this is a factual matter only, and evidence should 
have been introduced relating to this matter, since 
there may have been circumstances which would have 
rebutted the acceptance of payments for a like 
amount as being acceptance of the renewal of the 
term for a like term and like amount. The Court 
should have looked at the circumstances and dealt 
with the facts specifically in this case, rather than 
attempting to apply a general rule of law. 
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In the case of Alan v. Alan ( 1922) 154 Ga. 581, 
115 SE 17, the Court held that a landlord, by accept-
ing rent from a holding over tenant for the period / 
for which the landlord has prosecuted a Summary 
Proceeding to Eject the Tenant does not thereby con-
sent to a continuation of the tenancy. These facts 
are extremely similar to the case at hand, in that, 
the Appellants herein werM~~ecuting an action 
for ejectment and for ~S~llOR of the lease at the 
time the payments in question were accepted, again 
the Court erred in ruling as a matter of law, that 
acceptance of the payment renewed the lease for a 
like term, and for a like sum, because to do so was 
contrary to the terms of the lease and because the 
law does not substantiate this ruling. Evidence 
should have been admitted to show the circumstances 
and explain the reason for acceptance. 
The appellants would call the Court's attention 
to the case of Colyear v. Tobriner, et al. (1.936) 62 
P. 2d 7 41, a California Supreme Court Case. In this 
case, it is clearly established that when a party is 
leasing premises for a specified amount each month, 
and the lease contains an option for an increased 
rental payment for the renewal period, payment of 
the previously existing rental is not sufficient to 
establish a renewal for a like amount during the 
extended term. The intent of the parties must be 
determined, and therefore, it becomes a factual mat-
ter and not one of law, thus necessitating a trial 
of the case upon its merits rather than a determina· 
tion being made as a matter of law. See also 32 
Am Jur. 827 Landlord and Tenant Section 983, 
wherein it is stated: 
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"A lessor's acceptance of rent at the old 
rate from a lessee continuing in possession 
after expiration of the original term does 
not create a renewal, but merely a tenancy 
from month to month, where the original lease 
giving the lessee an option to renew also gave 
the lessor the right to demand an increased 
rental, which the lessor had made a condition 
of renewal, offering at the same time to per-
mit the lessee to continue to occupy from 
month to month at the old rental." 
In further support of the Appellants contention 
that the Court erred in its determination of this 
issue as a matter of law, it is and was at that time, 
Appellants contention that negotiations were being 
carried on regarding the rate of payment for the 
next term of the lease, (See Marvin C. Young Depo-
sition, page 25, lines 12-21, and George E. Bridwell 
Deposition, page 11, lines 8-21, and Alan D. Frand-
sen Deposition, page 1, lines 10-30 and page 15, 
lines 1-18) and had the Court acted properly, allow-
ing this matter to be determined factually, rather 
than ruling as a matter of law, this evidence could 
have been presented to the Court for its determina-
tion, for it is uniformly held that where a tenant 
remains in possession of realty after the expiration 
of his term and during a period in which he and 
the landlord are negotiating for a new lease, and 
the landlord accepts rents for this period, such ac-
ceptance is not a manifestation of the landlord's 
consent to an extension or renewal of the lease. 45 
ALR 2d, 841. In the case of Southern Railroad Com-
pany v. Peple 228 F. 853, the Court, although ac-
knowledging that continuance in possession by a 
renant with the payment of rent is usually regarded 
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as a renewal of the lease, said that this rule does 
not apply when the possession is retained and rent 
paid pending negotiations with respect to the renew-
al of the lease. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that this case should be reversed 
and remanded for trial on its merits. A jury should 
be allowed to determine whether the Respondent 
breached his contract in allowing, without the con-
sent of the Appellants, another attorney to handle 
the case. Appellants believe the results of the origi-
nal case would have been different on appeal and 
therefore a jury should also be allowed to determine 
whether or not the Respondent notified the appel-
lants of their right of appeal. This case should there-
fore be reversed and remanded for trial and Appel-
lants awarded their costs of appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEWART, TOPHAM & 
HARDING 
Attorneys at Law 
RAY M. HARDING 
Attorneys for 
Appellants 
